Statutory and Constitutional Problems with Judicially-Imposed Patent-Claim Limitations by Kyrazis, Sloane
Journal of Intellectual Property Law 
Volume 28 Issue 1 Article 8 
January 2021 
Statutory and Constitutional Problems with Judicially-Imposed 
Patent-Claim Limitations 
Sloane Kyrazis 
University of Georgia School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sloane Kyrazis, Statutory and Constitutional Problems with Judicially-Imposed Patent-Claim Limitations, 
28 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 187 (2021). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol28/iss1/8 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Journal of Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. 
Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu. 
Statutory and Constitutional Problems with Judicially-Imposed Patent-Claim 
Limitations 
Cover Page Footnote 
J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Georgia School of Law. Special thanks to Professor Kent Barnett for 
his guidance in writing this note. 
This notes is available in Journal of Intellectual Property Law: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol28/iss1/8 
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/12/2021 5:53 AM 
 
187 
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit handed down a 
decision, In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, upholding the practice 
of judicial claim limitation as non-violative of the due process rights of a 
patentee.1 There, the plaintiff, or patentee, asserted 1,975 claims for 31 patents.2  
The district judge presiding over the case arbitrarily limited the patentee to 64 
claims, with the provision that additional claims could be brought if they raised 
issues of infringement or validity not duplicative of the claims already brought.3  
The provision allowing additional claims was a constitutional safety valve, 
designed to mitigate the potential of the claim limitation practices to trample on 
a patentee’s due process rights.  On appeal, the patentee in In re Katz made this 
exact argument—that claim limitation is a government-sanctioned deprivation 
of property rights that are irrationally protected under the Constitution without 
the requisite process.4  
The In re Katz decision has been questioned in its conformity with a patentee’s 
due process rights, especially as the standard is applied in district courts 
throughout the country.  In addition, after a judgment on the merits of an 
infringement claim, federal courts refuse to allow patentees to assert any 
nonrepresentative claims that were limited at the outset of the original litigation 
as precluded by the doctrine of res judicata.  
This Note will first establish the principles of due process upon which the 
patentees’ arguments about due process violations are founded.  Additionally, 
the Note explains the rise of complex patent litigation and the dilemma that 
district court judges face in presiding over such voluminous and complex cases. 
This Note will argue that due process is not necessarily the most effective 
framework under which to criticize the In re Katz safety valve standard.  The more 
convincing argument is the safety valve’s contention with the provisions of the 
U.S. Patent Act.  Even if due process is not the best vehicle for criticizing the 
safety valve standard, this Note will nonetheless perform a full procedural due 
process analysis.  Additionally, this Note will acknowledge that the real due 
process violation likely occurs at the stage of refusal, based on principles of res 
judicata, to allow a patentee to bring claims that were classified in preceding 
litigation as nonrepresentative, thus not individually litigated.   
Finally, this Note provides potential solutions that balance the interests of a 
district judge in conducting their matters in a just and speedy manner and the 
property interest that a patentee has in his or her patent claims.  The solution will 
include a call for Congress to act in directives to limit the power of the United 
 
 1  639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 2  Id. at 1308. 
 3  Id. at 1309. 
 4  Id. at 1310. 
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States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to issue patents that become 
problematic in litigation, amend the U.S. Patent Act, or revise the current 
treatment of patent rights as on parity with real or personal property. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. IN RE KATZ 
The final decision of In re Katz by the Federal Circuit was the conclusion of a 
highly complex patent case on appeal from the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California.5  The plaintiff, Ronald A. Katz Technology 
Licensing LP (“Katz”), owned several patents on interactive call-processing 
systems and call-conferencing systems.6  “Between 2005 and 2006, Katz filed 25 
separate actions in the federal district courts in the Eastern District of Texas and 
the District of Delaware.”7  All those cases were transferred to the Central 
District of California for pretrial proceeding before Judge R. Gary Klausner, who 
presided over a previous case involving Katz and the asserted patents.8  In total, 
Katz asserted 1,975 claims from thirty-one patents.9  
At the outset of the proceedings, several defendants asked the court to limit 
the number of claims asserted in the action.10  Katz responded with a proposed 
assertion of fifty claims per defendant group, which could then be narrowed to 
twenty after discovery.11  The court mandated that only a total of sixty-four 
claims could be brought.12  This mandate opened a safety valve by allowing 
additional claims if a patentee raised issues of infringement or validity that were 
not duplicative of the claims already brought.13  
In response to the court’s mandate, Katz moved to sever and stay the non-
selected claims.14  The motion was denied by the court.15  The appeal at the 
Federal Circuit was largely a result of the district court’s refusal to sever and stay 
Katz’s non-selected claims.16  Katz claimed that, by entering final judgment 
without severing and staying Katz’s non-selected claim, the district court 
 
 5  Id. at 1308. 
 6  Id. 
 7  Id. at 1309. 
 8  Id. 
 9  Id. 
 10  Id. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Id. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. at 1309–10. 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. at 1309–1310. 
4
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol28/iss1/8
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/12/2021  5:53 AM 
2020] PATENT-CLAIM LIMITATIONS 191 
destroyed Katz’s right to its unselected claims without due process.17  The 
Federal Circuit rejected Katz’s due process arguments, holding that the trial court 
properly imposed a burden on Katz to show that any of the unselected claims 
raised issues of infringement or validity that were not duplicative of the selected 
claims.18  The Federal Circuit found that since Katz was in the best position to 
narrow the dispute, “allocating the production burden to the claimant will benefit 
the decision-making process and therefore will not offend due process . . . .”19  
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit announced that the district court’s due process 
analysis was valid “[b]ased on its initial determination that the asserted patents 
contained many duplicative claims.”20 
The Federal Circuit left open the possibility that a trial court’s claim selection 
decisions in such a case are reviewable.21  However, such a review is appropriate 
only if the moving party could demonstrate that some of its “unselected claims 
presented unique issues as to liability or damages” related to the accused 
infringement claims or defenses to invalidity.22  The Federal Circuit reaffirmed 
its rule in Stamps.com Inc. v. Endicia, Inc., upholding the lower court’s refusal to 
allow additional claims beyond those litigated, because the patentee “did not file 
a motion to add claims with the requisite showing of need.”23  In Stamps.com, the 
plaintiff “conceded the court’s authority to impose a limit on the number of 
claims,” but they still asserted due process violations for refusal to bring those 
claims that were not litigated.24  The Federal Circuit focused heavily on the 
plaintiff’s lack of attempt to “make a good cause showing” in its application of 
the In re Katz standard.25 
B. IN RE KATZ IN DISTRICT COURTS 
Since the Federal Circuit handed down its decision in In re Katz in 2011, 
several district courts have applied its articulated standard.26  Notably, in Masimo 
Corp. v. Philips Electronics North America Corp., the court applied the In re Katz 
standard to litigation between two entities where the plaintiff asserted seventeen 
 
 17  Id. at 1310. 
 18  Id. at 1311. 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. at 1312. 
 21  Id. at 1312-13. 
 22  Id. at 1312. 
 23  437 Fed. App’x 897, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 24  Id. at 902. 
 25  Id. at 902-03. 
 26  Elizabeth Rader, Preserving Due Process in Approaches to Narrowing Claims in Multi-Patent 
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independent claims with seventy-eight related dependent claims, all of which 
represented innovative features.27  In limiting the representative claims to thirty, 
the Federal District Court for the District of Delaware alluded to the In re Katz 
court’s finding that early reduction was permissible based on the “common 
genealogy of Katz’s patents.”28  Additionally, like In re Katz, the court purported 
to leave open the possibility that additional claims could be added with a good 
cause showing.29  No application of the In re Katz safety valve standard has 
yielded a result where the court found a good cause showing. 
C. DUE PROCESS 
So, why was Katz calling foul based on due process principles? The short 
answer is that intellectual property rights are just what they say they are – 
property rights.30  Consequently, due process is the constitutional clause that 
seeks to ensure that those property rights are not wrongfully taken from their 
holder without the proper procedure.31  The Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”32  The Fourteenth 
Amendment also guarantees that “[n]o State [shall] . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”33  In defining what due process 
requires, the Supreme Court announced in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co. that, at a minimum, “deprivation of life, liberty, or property by 
adjudication be proceeded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to 
the nature of the case.”34  The Mullane minimum standard for due process can 
be separated into two elements: notice of the charge or issue, and the opportunity 
for a meaningful hearing.35  Due process has been divided into two categories 
over time – procedural and substantive due process.36  In short, procedural due 
process requires the government to follow the necessary procedures before 
 
 27  918 F. Supp. 2d 277 (D. Del. 2013). 
 28  Id. at 283 (quoting In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d at 1312 
n.7)). 
 29  Rader, supra note 26 (citing Masimo, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 286 (D. Del. 2013)). 
 30  Intellectual Property, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intellectual_property (last visited Nov. 13, 2020) (“The law 
of intellectual property can be seen as analogous to the law of tangible property in that both 
consist of a bundle of rights conferred upon the property owner.”). 
 31  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 32  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 33  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 34  339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
 35  See id. (stating that when a proceeding is one in which property rights may be deprived, 
“notice and hearing must measure up to the standards of due process.”). 
 36  Procedural Due Process, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/procedural_due_process (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). 
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taking life, liberty, or property and prohibits “arbitrary and unfair deprivations” 
of the same “without procedural safeguards.”37  Claim limiting is inherently 
procedural since it relates to how the business of the court is conducted.38  The 
specific procedural process due in any case is decided by balancing several 
factors.39  These include the private interest affected; the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value 
of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, the government interest, 
including function involved, and fiscal and administrative burdens of additional 
procedure.40  As previously mentioned, on appeal, the Federal Circuit found that 
the trial judge did not violate Katz’s due process rights when he limited the 
number of claims to 64.41  The Federal Circuit cited the safety valve standard as 
the mitigating factor that prevented any due process violations. 42  Under such a 
standard, Katz could assert additional claims for adjudication as long as he could 
show that the new claims raised non-duplicative issues of validity or 
infringement.43 
D. PATENTS AS PROPERTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
An important protection guaranteed by due process is access to the courts, 
and whether the safety valve provides a patentee access to the courts to vindicate 
his or her rights consistent with due process is questionable.44  The Fourteenth 
Amendment and Fifth Amendment “require that the courts shall be open to 
every person with a right to a remedy for injury to . . . property . . . .”45  Since 
due process guarantees access to the courts to remedy an injury to property, a 
necessary question is whether courts treat a patent as a property right that is 
afforded the same due process protections contemplated by the Fifth 
Amendment.  It is fundamentally true that a patent-derived right is a property 
right that is on equal footing with rights associated with ownership of land or 
 
 37  Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1350 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 38  See Procedural Law, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/procedural_law (last visited Oct. 13, 2020) (“In particular, 
laws that provide how the business of the court is to be conducted.”). 
 39  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976). 
 40  Id. 
 41  See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(“We reject Katz’s due process argument. Katz has not shown that the claim selection 
procedure . . . was inadequate[.]”). 
 42  See id. at 1311–13 (describing the district court’s claim limitation and accompanying due 
process analysis as “efficient and fair” because Katz did not show that non-selected claims 
were not duplicative). 
 43  Id. at 1312. 
 44  See 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1912 (2020) (synthesizing that the right of access to 
the courts is protected by the constitutional due process clauses). 
 45  Id. (citing Coburn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 Ohio App. 3d. 322 (2010)). 
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personal property.46  Moreover, “the [patent] right rests on the same foundation, 
and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions [as land property 
rights].”47  Recently, the Supreme Court has announced that patents are “surely 
included within the ‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a State 
without due process of law.”48  
E. THE PATENT CLAUSE AND THE  U.S. PATENT ACT 
The next question is how patents got the same kind of  irrational protections 
as property rights.  The property right protected by a patent is derived directly 
from the Constitution.49  Article I grants Congress the power “to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”50  
Implementing its constitutional power, Congress enacted the U.S. Patent Act, 
which allows a patent to be granted to “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” subject to  
limitations in the act.51  The legal effect of a patent is a limited right of 
exclusion.52  For 20 years, a patentee has the right to exclude all others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the patented invention.53  The 
exclusionary nature of patent rights is important for individuals like Katz because 
patentees may exercise their constitutionally afforded patent rights only if they 
prevent others from using those same rights. 
Under the In re Katz safety valve, a patentee must be the one to make a 
showing that her claims are non-duplicative, thus deserving of adjudication.54  
The U.S. Patent Act states that a patent, and each distinct claim of a patent, is 
presumed valid.55  The statute says “[e]ach claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed 
valid independent of the validity of other claims.”56  Additionally, “dependent or 
multiple claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid 
 
 46  Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) (“A patent for an invention is as 
much property as a patent for land.”); see Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. 
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (recognizing that patents “have long been considered 
a species of property”). 
 47  Fruit-Jar, 94 U.S. at 96. 
 48  Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642. 
 49  See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8. 
 50  Id. 
 51  35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 52  See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952). 
 53  § 154(a)–(b). 
 54  In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 55  35 U.S.C. § 282(a)(2012). 
 56  Id. 
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claim.”57  The presumption of validity places the “burden of establishing 
invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof . . . on the party asserting such 
invalidity.”58  
If a patent holder brings an infringement claim against another party, the 
statute provides an invalidity defense against the infringement claim.59  As the 
statute dictates, the burden of establishing invalidity rests on the alleged infringer 
who is asserting invalidity as a defense.60  Congress did not expressly provide 
what standard of proof attaches to the burden on the party alleging invalidity.61  
The Supreme Court filled in the gaps in Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. Partnership.62  In 
that case, the Supreme Court held that by codifying the presumption of patent 
validity, Congress implicitly attached a heightened standard of proof to a claim 
for invalidity.63  The Court supported this finding by the long-time fixture of the 
common law interpretation of the effect of a presumption.64  In the context of 
patent infringement cases, the word “presumption” in patent validity has always 
had teeth, only to be overcome by “clear and cogent evidence.”65  The Court’s 
interpretation of § 282 was based on “the assumption that the ordinary meaning 
of [the] language” written by Congress in the statute “accurately expresses the 
legislative purpose.”66  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of § 282, finding that in order to have a successful invalidity 
defense against a claim for infringement, a party must prove invalidity by clear 
and convincing evidence.67  If the presumption of validity was not enough 
protection, the U.S. Patent Act also includes a short and clear statement that a 




 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
 59  35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2). 
 60  35 U.S.C § 282(a). 
 61  See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012) (stating only that the party asserting invalidity has the 
burden of proof). 
 62  564 U.S. 91 (2011). 
 63  Id. at 113-14. 
 64  Id. at 101-02. 
 65  Id. at 101 (quoting Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Lab’ys, Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 2 (1934)). 
 66  Id. at 101 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 
252 (2004)). 
 67  Id. at 102 (citing Radio Corp., 293 U.S. at 8 (1934)). 
 68  See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1952) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement 
of his patent.”). 
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F. MODERN PATENT LITIGATION 
1. Patent Claims 
Understanding claim limitation first requires an understanding of patent 
claims.  The description portion of a patent does just that — it describes the 
invention and the “manner and process of making and using it.”69  The 
description, together with the claims, make up the specification portion of a 
patent application.70  Claims make a patent valuable to its owner because they 
define the scope of legal protection.71  The USPTO stresses the importance of 
the claims, as they define the “protection afforded by the patent and which 
questions of infringement are judged by the courts.”72  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed this importance, announcing that “[i]t is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent 
law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is 
entitled the right to exclude.’”73  If claims are not properly drafted to cover every 
detail of the description, then the patent owner has no legal claim over those 
aspects of the description, and others would be free to appropriate the 
technology as they wish.74  Thus, it is in the patent owner’s interest to draft the 
claims as broadly as possible so that the owner secures legal protection over all 
possible situations or future iterations of a patent.75  However, the examiners at 
the USPTO are employed to determine whether the claims comply with the filing 
requirements.76  Therefore, a patent examiner will only allow claims to the actual 
invention as it is described.77 
 
2. Explosion of Patent Litigation 
The robust protections afforded by the U.S. Patent Act and the USPTO’s 
role raises the question of why judges need special procedures like claim 
 
 69  General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-
patents#heading-17. 
 70  Id. 
 71  IP and Business: Quality Patents: Claiming What Counts, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Feb. 
2006), https://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/drafting_patent_claims_fulltext.html. 
 72  General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 69. 
 73  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting 
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys. Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)). 
 74  See IP and Business: Quality Patents: Claiming What Counts, supra note 71 (explaining that 
when claims are not properly drafted, then inventions disclosed but not claimed become prior 
art). 
 75  See id. (“[B]road claims are attractive to the business applicant because they cover a 
greater range of products or situations . . . .”). 
 76  See id. ([A] patent examiner in an IP office will not allow broad claims that cover more 
than the inventor actually invented . . . .”). 
 77  Id. 
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limitation in patent cases.  The answer lies in the volume and complexity of 
patent litigation today.78  Patent litigation has become one of the most complex, 
lengthy, and costly types of litigation.79  These cases boast an average cost of 
$500,000 per claim and last an average of 2.7 years.80  Importantly, judicial 
intervention is the only way that patentees can assert and enforce their rights and 
accused infringers can continue to operate.81  Adding to the complexity of these 
cases are companies with large patent portfolios and even larger research and 
development budgets.82  These companies, and their continued modification of 
their patents, have increased the number of cumbersome cases that comprise the 
current patent litigation landscape.83  
Notably, there has been an explosion in patent litigation in recent years.84  
The number of patent suits filed in the year 2000 was around 2,500, with that 
number doubling to around 5,000 by 2014.85  Less empirical is the anecdotal 
evidence that patent cases are increasingly contentious because the global 
economy is increasingly dependent on technological innovation.86  Critics have 
stated that the law has “tilted too far” in favor of protecting intellectual property 
rights and resulting in stifled competition.87  The stakes are getting higher as the 
Supreme Court litigates more patent issues.88  It is important to consider the 
practice of judicial claim-limiting through the lens of complex modern patent 
litigation where patentees may assert thousands of infringement claims under 




 78  See Johnathon H. Ashter, Opening Pandora’s Box: Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Patent 
Litigation, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 217, 217 (2016) (“Patent litigation is widely regarded as one 
of the most complex types of civil litigation, with costs often totaling millions of dollars and 
typical cases lasting years.”). 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id. at 223, 227. 
 81  Id. at 222. 
 82  Rader, supra note 26. 
 83  Id. 
 84  Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 YALE L.J. 848, 850 
(2016). 
 85  Id. 
 86  Jess Bravin, As Patents Grow More Contentious, Battleground Shifts to High Court, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 28, 2006), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116468538911734236. 
 87  Id. 
 88  See id. (describing the increasingly complex and valuable patent landscape leading to 
litigation in the Supreme Court). 
 89  See David G. Chang, Claim Limitation: Confronting the Tension Between Limiting Claims in 
Complex Patent Litigation and Preserving a Patentee’s Due Process Rights, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. 
L.J. 19, 21 (2008) (describing modern patent litigation where many infringement claims are 
made under multiple patents). 
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3. Judicial Solutions to the Patent Explosion 
The paramount command of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
is to secure the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”90  Accordingly, it has long been recognized that district courts 
possess inherent powers that are “governed not by rule or statute but by the 
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve 
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”91  Given this inherent 
discretionary power, it is understandable that judges would invoke it when 
presiding over highly complex cases.  Because of the modern rise in volume and 
complexity of patent cases, judges have implemented various practices to make 
cases more administratively feasible.92  Claim limiting is one of these practices.93  
The litigation of multiple claims under multiple patents will be consolidated, and 
the presiding judge will order the patentee to select a limited number of 
representative claims to litigate.94  In re Katz was precisely this type of case.95 
 
4. Claim Preclusion 
An issue that may arise when narrowing claims in patent cases is the 
possibility that the patentee will want to assert an infringement claim later on 
using a claim that was deemed non-representative in prior litigation.96  Whether 
the patentee will be able to bring that claim may depend on the doctrine of res 
judicata, otherwise known as claim preclusion.97  The latter applies “when there 
is (i) ‘a judgment on the merits in a prior suit;’ (ii) ‘a second suit involving the 
same parties or their privies;’ and (iii) the second suit is ‘based on the same cause 
of action.’”98  The chief policy behind claim preclusion is to protect a defendant 
from re-litigating the same claim; thus, any claim that was or could have been 
raised previously must be dismissed as precluded.99  This doctrine poses a special 
 
 90  Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 
 91  Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016)(quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 
U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)). 
 92  See Chang, supra note 89, at 20 (explaining how courts have overcome “administrability 
barriers of large complex patent cases[.]”). 
 93  See id. (describing claim-limiting as a method to improve administrability). 
 94  See id. (explaining that Federal Circuit guidance on making complex patent cases more 
manageable has been involved consolidating patent claims). 
 95  In re Katz, 639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 96  See, e.g., In re Katz, 639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Katz arguing that his due process 
rights were violated because he could no longer vindicate rights on non-selected claims). 
 97  Res judicata, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/res_judicata (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). 
 98  Aviation Software, Inc. v. United States, 101 Fed. Cl. 656, 662-663 (2011) (quoting 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)). 
 99  See Klaassen v. Atkinson, 348 F.Supp.3d 1106, 1158 (D. Kan. 2018) (“[T]he doctrine of 
res judicata expresses a policy designed to protect the defendant from harassment and the 
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threat to patentees whose claims have been narrowed since claim preclusion also 
bars a suit arising from the same set of transactional facts.100  Moreover, there is 
a possibility that a patentee will never get to assert those non-representative 
claims to enforce their rights in court.  This danger illustrates both the statutory 
tension and the due process implications of judicial claim-limiting. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. INSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY TENSIONS 
In re Katz was appealed to the Federal Circuit, in part, because the district 
court’s refusal to sever and stay Katz’s non-representative or possibly duplicative 
claims allegedly violated Katz’s due process rights.101  Much of the commentary 
and criticism of this case focuses on the tensions between a possible due process 
violation and the act of judicial claim limiting.102  What is more troubling about 
the In re Katz holding, and the practice of judicial claim-limiting, is the stark 
tension with the U.S. Patent Act’s text and its purpose.  
 
1. Institutional Power to Grant Patent Rights 
The practice of judicial claim-limiting in patent cases is at odds with Title 35 
of the United States Code because it undermines the clear congressional intent 
to codify the process by which a patentee can secure patent rights for their works 
and inventions.  Title 35 outlines what a patentee must do to get patent rights 
and the process of securing such rights for their works or inventions.103  Since 
the framers thought patent rights were important, Congress used its 
constitutional power to create the USPTO to systematically administer patent 
rights.104 
The U.S. Patent Act requires an applicant to submit a written application for 
a patent to the USPTO consisting of a specification, drawings or specimens, and 
an oath or declaration stating that the individual believes himself or herself to be 
the original inventor.105  The specification requires a “written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms,” so “any person skilled in the art to which it pertains” 
 
public from multiple litigation.”)(quoting Griffith v. Stout Remodel., Inc., 548 P.2d 1238, 1240 
(Kan. 1976)). 
 100  Houston Prof’l Towing Ass’n v. City of Houston, 812 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 101  In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1310. 
 102  See, e.g., Rader, supra note 26 (posing the question whether the In re Katz decision is at 
odds with due process). 
 103  See generally, 35 U.S.C. § 1–390 (outlining requirements for grant of a patent). 
 104  35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 105  35 U.S.C. § 111 (2012) 35 U.S.C. § 115(b) (2012). 
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can make and use the invention.106  Most importantly, the specification includes 
“one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject 
matter which the inventor . . . regards as the invention.”107 
Once the application is filed, it is examined by a patent examiner.108  If it 
appears to the examiner that the “applicant is entitled to a patent under the law,” 
a patent is issued, and the applicant becomes a patent holder, or patentee.109  If 
the application is not issued and the patent is rejected, the USPTO examiner will 
notify the applicant and include reasons for rejections or requirements needed to 
move forward with the prosecution of the patent applied for.110  The U.S. Patent 
Act explicitly allows an applicant to appeal adverse USPTO decisions to the U.S. 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.111 
As a whole, this statutory scheme constitutes a large hurdle that patentees 
must clear in order to secure patent rights.  The burden on the patentee to secure 
patent protection involves time and attention to detail in drafting their 
applications.112  As a practical matter, successful patent prosecution generally 
requires hefty legal fees because a patent agent or attorney is usually needed to 
draft and argue the patent application before the USPTO.113   
The challenges of the patent application process intentionally puts the 
USPTO into the role of gatekeeper – allowing or disallowing the benefits of 
patent rights to those applicants whose inventions meet the legal standards 
established by Congress.  A federal judge engaging in claim limitation undercuts 
the USPTO’s prior decision that the patentee was entitled to legal rights 
protecting their ability to make, use, and sell their inventions for a limited time.  
By engaging in claim limitation and refusing to hear a claim that the USPTO has 
already decided has legal force, a judge usurps the power granted to the USPTO 
to issue patents.  Federal courts have recognized that they have no authority to 
adjudicate with respect to pending patents, recognizing that “Congress . . . 
explicitly vested the [USPTO] with sole discretion over the ‘granting and issuing 
of patents’”.114  Thus, the whole purpose of the provisions dictating the patent 
 
 106  35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 107  35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). 
 108  See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2002) (“The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the 
application and the alleged new invention . . . .”). 
 109  Id. 
 110  35 U.S.C. § 132 (2012). 
 111  35 U.S.C. § 134 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2012). 
 112  General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-
patents#heading-17. 
 113  Id. 
 114  Camsoft Data Sys., Inc. v. S. Elecs. Supply, Inc., 756 F.3d 327, 334 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1122 (2015). 
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application and issuance process is frustrated.  If patent rights are already 
established as valid by the examining body of the USPTO and a judge refuses to 
recognize that decision, this practice renders the application process ineffectual.  
In consequence, judicial claim-limiting conflicts with Congress’ intention that the 
USPTO be powerful in administering patent rights to qualified applicants. 
Judicial claim-limiting effectively disregards the U.S. Patent Act’s provisions 
and, in turn, ignores the Constitution drafters’ intent to vest patentees with 
powerful rights.  The Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power to grant 
essential, temporary monopolies to authors and inventors of their works and 
inventions in order to promote the progress of “Science and useful Arts.”115  It 
is clear that the intellectual property rights granted from the Patent Clause were 
considered by the framers as imperative for the development and security of the 
new country for which they were building a structure of governance.  The 
legislative history of the Constitution indicates unanimity in this sentiment.  As 
James Madison wrote in Federalist Paper No. 43, the “utility” of the power 
entrusted to Congress to grant these rights “will scarcely be questioned.”116  The 
U.S. Patent Act was promulgated as a response to this all-important 
constitutional provision.117  Based on drafter’s intent, to undermine the 
provisions of the U.S. Patent Act is to ignore the looming history and purpose 
that culminated in the enactment of federal patent laws that are rooted in the 
constitution itself.  
 
2. Tensions with Specific Provisions of the U.S. Patent Act 
In addition to the tension with purpose of the Act, the narrowing patent 
claims and the safety valve contradict specific provisions of the U.S. Patent Act.  
The starkest tension between judicial claim limitation and the U.S. Patent Act is 
the statutory presumption of validity of a patent and its claims.  § 282 of the U.S. 
Patent Act requires that: 
[a] patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent 
(whether in independent, dependent, or multiple dependent 
form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of 
other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be 
presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim.118 
In addition, the statute places the “burden of establishing invalidity of a patent 
or any claim thereof” on the party asserting invalidity.119 
 
 115  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 116  THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison). 
 117  35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 118  35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). 
 119  Id. 
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a. Contradiction of Plain Language of the Statute 
Judicial claim limitation is not consistent with the U.S. Patent Act because it 
contradicts § 282’s plain command that a patent, and all its claims, shall be 
presumed valid.  The starting point for statutory interpretation is looking at the 
plain language of the statute.120  The plain language is the most obvious guide in 
determining the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute.121  At a cursory 
glance, judicial claim limitation is a clear departure from the statute’s plain text 
because a judge is barring claims from adjudication and placing the burden on 
the patentee to establish validity.  Under § 282, a patentee asserting an 
infringement claim in federal court would have the advantageous starting point 
of presumed validity of all claims under their patent, including those claims that 
may be derivative of claims in the same patent which have been invalidated.122  
The drafters used the word “independently” to describe the manner in which 
each claim must be considered.123  In addition, the drafters exhaustively included 
any form of a claim, whether they are in “independent, dependent, or multiple 
dependent form.”124  The In re Katz court sanctioned the safety valve approach 
that only allowed patentees to assert additional patent claims outside of the 
allotted number if they were not duplicative of those claims asserted, or raised 
additional issues of liability or damages.125  This test, in several ways, ignores the 
statutory requirement that all patent claims are presumed valid.  First, it does not 
allow all claims, no matter what form they are in, to have statutorily-guaranteed 
validity.  Any presumption or protection contemplated by § 282 for a claim not 
allowed to be brought before the court effectively disappears under the safety 
valve standard.  In addition, the safety valve test runs afoul the language of § 282 
because it disallows a patentee from asserting dependent or multiple dependent 
claims.  Thus, a dependent or multiple dependent claims would likely be 
considered “duplicative” by a federal judge determining the legal effect of a 
patent claim through claim construction. 
The test is especially troubling when considering the statute’s requirement 
that even those claims dependent on invalidated claimed are presumed valid.  If, 
upon decision on the merits, a “representative claim” asserted by a patentee was 
invalidated, any dependent claim that a district court refused to allow at the 
outset of the case would never get the presumption of validity that § 282 
 
 120  Statutory Construction, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/statutory_construction (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). 
 121  Id. 
 122  35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). 
 123  Id. 
 124  Id. 
 125  In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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explicitly contemplates.126  The presumption of validity for dependent claims is 
a particularly strong starting point for a patentee in litigation.  The legislature’s 
special attention to claims potentially derivative of invalid claims, evidenced in 
the statute’s language, reinforces that each claim is presumed valid and 
protectable.  Thus, no matter how many claims are asserted, a judge must apply 
this presumption of validity to comply with the U.S. Patent Act. 
To round out and sharpen the tension between claim limitation and the 
language of the U.S. Patent Act, § 281 also provides that a patentee will have 
enforcement rights for their patent by civil remedy.127  Specifically, guaranteed 
access to the courts for enforcement is the only remedy named in the U.S. Patent 
Act.128  In light of the foregoing statutory provisions, the enforcement provision 
encompasses the core idea of the statute that every claim of a patent issued is 
legally enforceable by the courts of the United States.  By engaging in claim 
limitation, and not allowing patentees to assert all of their claims, the courts are 
ignoring this important provision that gives patent rights their teeth and value.  
 
b. Contradiction of Courts’ Ongoing Interpretation of the Statute 
Not only does the safety valve conflict with the U.S. Patent Act’s plain text, 
but its essence runs contrary to the groundwork that courts, including the Federal 
Circuit, have laid in interpreting the statute. 
i. The Burden of Proof and Interpretation of ‘Presumption’ 
The language of § 282 requires that the burden of establishing patent 
invalidity rests on the party asserting such invalidity.129  Practically, the party 
asserting invalidity in litigation where a patentee’s claims are being limited is the 
party accused of infringement, as the statute expressly provides an invalidity 
defense to patent infringement.130  Put simply, the burden of proof is on the 
defendant, not the patentee.131  Congress did not expressly provide what 
standard of proof attaches to the defendant’s burden.132  Filling in the gaps, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding in Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. 
Partnership to establish that, in order to have a successful invalidity defense against 
a claim for infringement, a party must prove invalidity by clear and convincing 
evidence, a heightened standard of proof. 133  Just as § 282 was interpreted in the 
 
 126  35 U.S.C. § 282(a). 
 127  See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1952) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement 
of his patent.”). 
 128  Id. 
 129  35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 
 130  35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2). 
 131  Id. 
 132  See id. (stating only that the party asserting invalidity has the burden of proof). 
 133  564 U.S. at 102 (citing Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng. Lab’ys, Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 8 
(1934)). 
17
Kyrazis: Statutory and Constitutional Problems with Judicially-Imposed Pat
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2021
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/12/2021  5:53 AM 
204 J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 28:1 
preceding subsection, the Court’s interpretation of § 282 was based on “the 
assumption that the ordinary meaning of [the] language” written by Congress in 
the statute “accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”134  
Once again, the safety valve test completely undermines the statute by 
effectively removing the burden of proof, which rests heavily on the defendant 
according to the court’s own interpretation of the statute, and placing it on the 
patentee.135  § 282 could not be clearer in its articulation of which party the 
burden of proof rests upon.136  In interpreting § 282, the Federal Circuit and the 
Supreme Court have doubled down on the language of the statute and made that 
burden as heavy as possible in the civil litigation context, requiring a showing by 
clear and convincing evidence.137  Yet, district judges are forcing patentees to 
show that any additional claims, which have been patented, are non-duplicative 
and valid, and thus, valid.138  This effectively places the burden on the patentee 
to demonstrate the validity of her claims.  This is a judicially created burden-
shifting that is completely inconsistent with § 282.  
Not only is this burden-shifting not supported by the statute, but it does not 
follow the logic of the Federal Circuit’s own interpretation of the same.  As 
outlined above, the Federal Circuit took a belt-and-suspenders approach in 
articulating the standard of proof that a defendant would have to meet in 
asserting invalidity of a patentee’s claims in defending an alleged infringement.139  
The defendant’s heavy burden of proof does not comport with the burden placed 
on the patentee to show that any “unselected claims presented unique issues as 
to liability or damages.”140 
ii. Claim Construction 
Other doctrines reflecting an expansive interpretation of the U.S. Patent Act, 
insofar as how broad the patentee’s rights are in legal force, illustrate the 
inconsistency of judicial claim-limiting and the ongoing judicial interpretation of 
the U.S. Patent Act.141  Patent claim construction is the process of determining 
 
 134  Id. at 101 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 
252 (2004)). 
 135  Microsoft, 564 U.S. at 102. 
 136  See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of 
his patent.”). 
 137  Microsoft, 564 U.S. at 102. 
 138  See, e.g., In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 
2011)(requiring Katz to show that any patent claims added to the suit were non-duplicative of 
the representative claims). 
 139  Microsoft, 564 U.S. at 102. 
 140  In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1312. 
 141  See, e.g., Glen P. Belvis, The Doctrine of Equivalents and § 112 Equivalents, BRINKS GILSON 
& LIONE, https://www.brinksgilson.com/files/100.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2020) (“The 
doctrine of equivalents is a judicially created doctrine that is expansive in nature.”). 
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the boundaries of the legal protection provided by the patent.142  When a 
patentee is seeking to enforce their rights under a patent, federal judges are tasked 
with claim construction.143  If claims are the most valuable aspect of a patent for 
its owner, then claim construction is the most important step in the litigation 
process because a judge will use her own interpretation of the claims to decide 
issues of infringement and invalidity.144  The Federal Circuit outlined the 
standards of claim construction in Phillips v. AWH Corp.145  A court will first look 
to the plain language of the claims in the patent, potentially with the aid of a 
general-purpose dictionary.146  If that is not informative, as the Federal Circuit 
noted that it often is not because of the complex nature of patent law, the court 
must examine the “meaning of a claim term as understood by persons of skill in 
the [relevant] art.”147  The Federal Circuit also emphasizes the instructive nature 
of the immediate context in which a claim term appears, as well as “other claims 
of the patent in question”.148  Finally, the Federal Circuit requires that claims and 
the terms therein “do not stand alone,” and must be read as a part of “a fully 
integrated written instrument.”149  Thus, extrinsic sources can be taken into 
account, such as the prosecution history.150  
It seems incongruous to standardize the process of judicial interpretation of 
patent claims in this manner and simultaneously refuse to consider additional 
claims that make up the “fully integrated written instrument.”151  If a judge is to 
consider the patent as a whole, which includes other contextual claims as well as 
the prosecution history to determine issues of infringement, then the narrowing 
of claims completely frustrates this process and should be considered at the very 
least a hinderance, and at most, a detriment to finding whether a patent has in 
fact been infringed.  Most importantly, the narrowing of claims and the 
consequential narrowing of patent rights contradicts the expansive interpretation 
that the courts have taken thus far in claim construction. 
iii. Doctrine of Equivalents 
The narrowing of rights by judicial claim limiting is additionally inconsistent 
with the doctrine of equivalents, because the doctrine is a broad interpretation 
 
 142  J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and 
Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 3 (2013). 
 143  Id. at 4. 
 144  See id. (“[W]hen patentees seek to enforce their patents, the task of claim construction 
falls to generalist federal district court judges . . . .”). 
 145  415 F.3d 1303, 1313-15 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 146  Id. at 1314. 
 147  Id. at 1313. 
 148  Id. at 1314. 
 149  Id. at 1315 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en banc)). 
 150  Id. at 1314-15. 
 151  Id. at 1315 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978). 
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of the U.S. Patent Act that expands a patentee’s rights.  Even though a patentee’s 
legal rights are based on the text of the claims, courts may extend the protection 
of the patent beyond the literal wording of the claims under the doctrine of 
equivalents.152  Under the doctrine, even “if an asserted claim does not literally 
read on an accused product, infringement may still occur . . . if there is not a 
substantial difference between the limitations of the claim and the accused 
product.”153  The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent competitors of the 
patentee who are trying to avoid merely literal infringement from attempting to 
introduce insignificant modifications into the claimed invention.154  In the 
context of In re Katz, differences in the patentee’s claims considered non-
representative, and not considered in the judgment for infringement, could have 
been considered equivalent to the infringer’s claims.  The doctrine ultimately 
takes an expansive view of how far a patentee’s rights extend and the court’s role 
in enforcing them.  The narrowing of claims is not only inconsistent with how 
extensively the courts have interpreted a patentee’s rights, but also may render 
the doctrine of equivalents ineffectual, as not all claims would be considered in 
litigation. 
B. DOES THE SAFETY VALVE STANDARD VIOLATE DUE PROCESS? 
Although I submit that the safety valve’s largest problem is its inconsistency 
with statutory provisions, it is important to note that the grounds on which In re 
Katz was appealed was the alleged violation of Katz’s constitutional due process 
rights.155  Commentary on this case has been couched in terms of due process, 
and district courts have engaged in judicial claim-limiting citing In re Katz as 
precedent to ensure that they do not trample on the due process rights of 
patentees.156  The question then becomes whether the allowance of an 
opportunity to introduce “unselected claims present[ing] unique issues as to 
liability or damages,”157 or good cause, is enough to comport with due process.  
 
 152  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., Inc., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950). 
 153  Doctrine of Equivalents, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/doctrine_of_equivalents (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (“The 
purpose of the doctrine is to prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of a patented 
invention by changing only minor or insubstantial details of the claimed invention[.]”); Bayer 
AG v. Elan Pharm. Rsch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 154  Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1250. 
 155  In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 156  See Masimo Corp. v. Phillips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 918 F. Supp. 2d 277, 283 (D. Del. 
2013) (citing In re Katz); see also Stamps.com Inc. v. Endicia, Inc., 437 Fed. App’x 897, 902 
(Fed. Cir. 2011)(citing In re Katz). 
 157  In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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Doctrinal interpretation of the Fifth Amendment yielded procedural due 
process in Mathews v. Eldridge.158  In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that 
individuals had a statutorily created property right in social security benefits, and 
the termination of such benefits had due process implications.159  In comparison, 
a patentee has statutorily created property rights in patent claims,160 and therefore 
the refusal to hear those claims may similarly have due process implications.  The 
safety valve articulated in In re Katz was likely the Federal Circuit’s nod to the 
threshold requirement that some process is due.  However, the Federal Circuit, 
sitting as an appellate court, failed to engage in a full due process analysis, holding 
only that Katz failed to “demonstrate that the district court’s claim selection 
procedure risked erroneously depriving it of its rights and that the risk 
outweighed the added costs associated with a substitute procedure.”161  Thus, 
the court reasoned, Katz failed to make a due process claim.162  The court opined 
that Katz was in a better position to show that the claims were non-duplicative, 
thus the burden shifting was reasonable.163  Additionally, the court rested its 
holding on the fact that Katz made an unsubstantiated claim that 64 claims were 
too few, and he never attempted to show why additional claims needed to be 
adjudicated.164  As the Federal Circuit found, it seems that the safety valve 
comports with due process because Katz could have brought forth claims to be 
reviewed upon the proper showing of need, thus mitigating any risk of erroneous 
deprivation of its property rights.165  It is logical for the court to shake its finger 
at the patentee because it looks like the patentee is asking the court for redress 
for a wrong it brought on herself by not coming up with good cause for her 
additional claims.  However, the safety valve still does not entirely mitigate the 
due process problem.  The real due process problem arises from the effects of 
claim limiting on further litigation under principles of res judicata.  
In 2016, when a patentee voluntarily removed claims from a previous suit 
against a defendant, the Federal Circuit held that a patentee’s due process rights 
were not violated when the same claims were barred from being brought in a 
 
 158  424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 159  Id. at 332-33. 
 160  Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) (“A patent for an invention is as 
much property as a patent for land.”); see Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. 
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (recognizing that patents “have long been considered 
a species of property”). 
 161  In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1311 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 391, 332 (1976)). 
 162  Id. 
 163  Id. at 1311. 
 164  Id. at 1311-12. 
 165  See In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1312 (“Because Katz did not file a motion to add claims with 
the requisite showing of need, the court concluded that Katz ‘cannot legitimately complain 
that it did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard on those claims.’”). 
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subsequent suit against the same defendant.166  The court reasoned that the 
patentee was precluded from “trying to get a second bite at the apple,”167 and 
that boilerplate reservation of rights to assert the non-selected claims at a later 
time were negated by the patentee’s own active participation in narrowing the 
claims.168  Although Katz objected to the narrowing of claims, it is likely that the 
narrowing of the claims would prevent any of the non-representative claims from 
being asserted against the same defendant.169  Thus, the due process analysis 
should be informed by the effects of the safety valve on the patentee’s rights to 
assert any claims in the future that were narrowed at the outset of a previous 
lawsuit.  
The Federal Circuit did not perform a full due process analysis in its In re Katz 
opinion,170 thus a full analysis is performed below to inform the due process 
implications of patent claim limitations and safety valve test.  
The first factor to evaluate is the private interest affected.171  Weighing heavily 
in favor of the inadequacy of the Court’s safety valve test is the private interest 
affected because a patent right and each claim under that patent is not only 
presumed valid by federal statute, but is traditionally recognized at common law 
as a property right protectable by the same sanctions as real or personal property 
rights.172  Companies in the United States globally spend trillions of dollars on 
research and development to build their patent portfolios, and patents serve as 
financial corporate assets in the modern market.173  In large or medium-sized 
companies, a strong patent portfolio provides confidence and security in day-to-
day business.174  For smaller companies, or start-ups, the entire valuation of the 
company is usually dependent on the company’s patent portfolio.175  
Technological innovation permeates modern society and businesses are 
 
 166  Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. ABBYY USA Software House, Inc., 813 F.3d 1368, 1376 
(Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 167  Id. at 1374. 
 168  Id. at 1376. 
 169  See id. at 1376 (holding that voluntarily narrowing claims prevents non-representative 
claims from being asserted against the same defendant). 
 170  See In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1312–13 (The court merely approved the district court’s due 
process analysis, and did not engaged in a due process analysis as laid out as articulated in 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). 
 171  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 (1976). 
 172  Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) (“A patent for an invention is as 
much property as a patent for land.”); see Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. 
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (recognizing that patents “have long been considered 
a species of property”). 
 173  Dr. Masoud Vakili, Patent Portfolio Valuations – Importance of IP and Patents, IP WATCH DOG 
(July 12, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/07/12/patent-portfolio-
valuations/id=85409/. 
 174  Id. 
 175  Id. 
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responding by moving from tangible assets to intangible assets that are protected 
by patents.176  With this type of capital movement in the business world, it is 
clear that economic survival is dependent on the ability to protect and enforce 
the rights guaranteed by a patent.  
Also lending heavily to the unconstitutional nature of the safety valve test is 
the high risk that a patentee will be erroneously deprived of a patent right because 
of the arbitrary limits on “representative” claims and the danger of claim 
preclusion in later litigation.  The court’s mandate that only representative claims 
may be brought is only effective for judging infringement in the context of a 
specific case with specific facts.  For example, the arbitrary number of 64 claims 
in In re Katz may have been sufficient to adjudge whether or not the defendants 
infringed Katz’s patents in that specific litigation.  This explains Katz’s inability 
to come forward with good cause to bring additional claims that would raise 
unique issues.  However, any litigation in the future involving non-representative 
claims that were forced out of a former case because of common “genealogy”177 
would be barred from ever being brought as precluded under principles of res 
judicata.178  This fact is aggravated by the reality of modern patent litigation 
where infringement claims arise against multiple defendants.179  For example, if 
Katz attempted to bring non-representative claims that were excluded in the 
2011 case against any one of the multiple defendants, the Federal Circuit would 
have strong precedent to refuse to hear the case because the safety valve’s 
falsehood of protection states that Katz had a chance to make a meaningful 
showing of need to bring the claim in prior litigation.  
The probability that more process would mitigate the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of a patentee’s rights is great because the ability to sever and stay 
non-representative claims would allow a patentee to enforce all of their patents 
and claims.  Under the U.S. Patent Act, judicial intervention is the only mode of 
enforcing a patentee’s rights.180  Given that claim preclusion for claims that have 
never been litigated is the grounds for a due process argument, the court could 
employ some equitable measures that would preserve a patentee’s right to have 
their day in court for all of their claims.  For example, the court could do what 
Katz asked of it: sever and stay all non-representative claims.181  This would allow 
a patentee the ability to bring an infringement claim based on a patent claim that 
 
 176  Id. 
 177  In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 178  Res judicata, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/res_judicata (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). 
 179  See Chang, supra note 89 (describing modern patent litigation where many infringement 
claims are made under multiple patents against multiple defendants). 
 180  See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of 
his patent.”). 
 181  See In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1310 (“Katz appealse the district court’s decision not to sever 
and stay the unselected claims.”). 
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was excluded without the threat of a dismissal based on claim preclusion.  It 
would be ignorant not to acknowledge the possibility for abusive litigation tactics 
where a patentee would attempt to re-litigate against the same defendants using 
non-representative claims.  Therefore, the sever and stay solution could be 
accompanied by a requisite burden of production for the patentee to show some 
set of facts as to why the infringement claim is warranted.  This type of measure 
may impose some administrative costs on the judiciary, but not so much that it 
would outweigh the benefit of preserving a patentee’s rights.  A judge’s discretion 
to manage his case docket in the way that he sees fit is not a justification that is 
sufficient to overcome a violation of due process.  Practical administration of the 
law should not be viewed as a superior interest to constitutional due process. 
The safety valve standard employed by the Federal Circuit does not comport 
with constitutional due process because it practically destroys the property 
interest of a patentee by barring infringement claims that are statutorily presumed 
as valid.  On balance of the Mathews factors, judicial claim-limiting and the safety 
valve test is at odds with procedural process due because there is an erroneous 
deprivation of a patentee’s property interest without sufficient justification. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, there are serious tensions between judicial claim limiting in 
patent litigation and the U.S. Patent Act that have blurred the clear congressional 
intent to afford certain rights to patentees through a process outside of the 
courts.  The rise of complex patent litigation has resulted in the Federal Circuit 
articulating a standard for dealing with claim limitation that violates 
constitutional due process.  The In re Katz safety valve may appear to satisfy due 
process on its face.  However, it fails to do so in light of the ramifications of 
claim limiting when non-representative claims are barred from later litigation 
under principles of res judicata. 
The Federal Circuit may weigh in on the issue again in Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper 
Networks.182  This case addresses the constitutionality of methods of claim 
limiting that do not necessarily include a safety valve.183  By necessity, the Federal 
Circuit may be forced to re-evaluate, or re-explain its holding in In re Katz.  
The court should find that the biggest problem with judicial claim-limiting 
under the In re Katz safety valve standard is the stark contrast between the text 
and the provisions of the U.S. Patent Act.  This contrast invites congressional 
action to amend the statute or enact another congressional directive that would 
ease the current tension. It is not the place of the courts to undermine 
congressional intent.  If Congress was to speak on the issue, the ripest tension to 
 
 182  No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA, 2020 WL 5988532 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2019). 
 183  Id. 
 183  Id. 
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relieve is the opposition of the presumption of validity in § 282 of the U.S. Patent 
Act, which is undermined by the court’s requirement that the patentee make a 
good cause showing of need to include non-representative claims.  To reach the 
problematic foundation of a patentee’s arguments about constitutional due 
process violations, Congress would also have to issue some directive on whether, 
in the context of high technology and modern patent portfolios, patents should 
still get protection akin to real or personal property under the Constitution.  
Until such congressional statement is issued, district judges can manage their 
dockets efficiently while also preserving patentees’ due process rights by 
instituting equitable judicial solutions, such as a sever and stay for those claims 
that were not considered representative.  Additionally, patentees should be 
careful to preserve their rights by objecting to mandates from the trial court 
attempting to narrow their claims.  Any objections of this nature should be 
supported by specific issues of need or damage, although it is unclear what 
exactly this showing would require given that no patentee has defeated a 
narrowing order for good cause.  Clarity on this issue is important because 
patentees need to know how to protect their rights conferred on them through 
the granting of their patent claims. 
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